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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
-v- : Case No. 
14251 
LELAND FACER and ROBERT : 
W. SHIELDS, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Leland Jack Facer, appeals 
from a conviction of the crime of intentionally 
employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud 
entered against him in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty of intentionally 
employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud 
by a jury and sentenced to serve in the Utah State 
Prison for a term of three (3) years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the verdict and judgment rendered by 
the jury at the trial. 
- 1 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the latter half of 1972 the appellant 
commenced a series of transactions designed to promote 
trading and create market activity in the stock of 
Great Northern Corporation (T. 74, 155, 223, 228, 
294-296). The appellantBs interest in Great 
Northern began during the summer when he met with the 
corporation^ president to discuss the corporation 
and its assets (T. 292) • Thereafter,, trading in 
the corporation's stock began to significantly 
increase due to the appellant's own trading and 
his encouragement of others to trade in the stock 
of the corporation (T. 68, 294, 328, 425-426). 
Moreover, at the end of August one of the appellant's 
associates, Robert Shields, procured a loan of 
$35,000 for the appellant in order to raise trading 
money (T. 329). The appellant1s sonfs home was used 
as security for the loan and stock in Great Northern 
was pledged on the loan on the home (T. 330, 332). 
A month later the appellant received another 3oan 
from Shields for $25,000 (T. 336). The stock of 
Great Northern was subsequently split forward on 
a five-for-one basis and again on a three-for-one 
basis (T. 68, 347-50). Furthermore, rumors were 
- 2 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
heard concerning possible mergers of Great Northern. 
A merger was finally consummated between Great 
Northern and American International Travel Services 
Company (T, 334-38/ 444). Based upon representa-
tions by the appellant. Shields invested $40,000 
in the stock of AIT. This money was taken by the 
appellant even though AIT was an inactive company 
of which the only assets were old mining claims 
(T. 339, 458, 459, 462). 
The appellant executed the sales and 
purchases of stock by means of nominee accounts and 
so-called "wash trades" or "float trades" (T. 86,. 
116, 200-202, 217). Nominees are persons who own 
accounts in various brokerage houses and normally 
charge a commission for their use. The purpose of 
using a nominee account is to hide the identity of 
the seller or buyer (T. 16). The appellant requested 
and received permission to use Shield's account at 
three brokerage houses which dealt in the appellant's 
stock (T. 80, 341, 345). Shields purchased the stock 
for the appellant by receiving checks from the 
appellant's wife (T. 341, 344). The appellant and 
1 -
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another associate also requested and received 
permission to use various other nominee accounts 
(T. 181, 420, 423). The appellant used nominee 
accounts whose owners had no knowledge of their 
account's usage by the appellant (Tc 308-309, 315, 
317, 321, 323). 
The procedures used in conducting a "wash 
trade" or "float trade" consisted of two simul-
taneous transactions. First, the appellant sold 
his stock to Continental Securities, Inc., as 
part of a cash trade, allowing him to receive pay-
ment immediately upon his payment of a double com-
mission (T. 202). Thus, the appellant avoided the 
customary seven day waiting period. Second, at 
the same time the appellant sold his stock to 
Continental, he purchased the same stock through 
a directed trade from another brokerage house 
(T. 92, 182) * However, when the appellant purchased 
the stock he took advantage of the seven day payment 
rule and was not required to pay for the stock until 
one week after the purchase. Continental transferred 
the stock to the other brokerage house for considera-
tion, which was immediately paid to the appellant. 
Thus, in essence the appellant retained ownership 
of the stock as well as an interest free loan 
for seven days, all for the price of a double 
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commission. Owners and employees of the brokerage 
houses were not aware that the appellant was on 
both ends of the transaction nor were they aware 
of the terms of payment or that payment was made 
on checks not written by the owners of the nominee 
accounts(T. 26, 36, 55, 68, 81, 82, 110, 233). 
The owner of one brokerage house testified that he 
did not allow float trades if he knew they were 
going on (T. 55). In addition, Shields, who 
participated in the actual selling and buying of 
securities for the appellant, testified that he 
did not know what the appellant was doing. (T. 346) . 
The market activity created by the appellant 
continued until February, 1973, when, because of 
the significant increase in trading of Great 
Northern stock and the lack of information con-
cerning the enterprise, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission suspended trading in the stock for ten 
days. Thereafter, a number of transactions occurred 
in the stock of Great Northern, Silver Gull Corpor-
ation, and West Am Corporation. However, the market 
for the stocks deteriorated rapidly (T.71, 91, 
158, 179, 388, 402, 413). During March, 
1973, all of the checks written by the appel-
lant's wife to pay for the purchased securities 
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were not covered by sufficient funds (T. 387, 388, 
443). The brokerage houses became owners of stock 
substantially lessened in value and thus collectively 
suffered losses in excess of $150,000 (T. Doc. 6)• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE ELEMENT OF RELIANCE 
BECAUSE RELIANCE IS NOT AN ELEMENT IN A CRIMINAL 
SECURITIES FRAUD PROSECUTION. 
It is a well settled common law standard, 
followed by the Utah Supreme Court, that the trial 
court is not obliged to give a requested instruc-
tion unless it accurately states the law. State 
v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357, 359 (1972). 
This principle applies with equal force to 
instructions in prosecutions for the violation 
of statutes regulating securities. Respondent 
contends that by refusing to instruct the jury with 
respect to reliance the trial court accurately 
stated the law. 
Appellant was convicted of intentionally 
employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud 
under Utah Code Amu § 61-1-1 (1953), which provides: 
- 6 -
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"It is unlawful for any person, 
in connection with the offer, sale, 
or purchase of any security, directly 
or indirectly, 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact 
necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, 
not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, prac-
tice or course of business 
which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person." 
This statute was adopted as part of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act which was modeled after Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C;§ 77q(a), and § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.106-5, of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In accordance 
with previous decisions of this Court in securities 
fraud cases, and because the present case appears 
to be a case of first impression, respondent believes 
that the Utah statute is sufficiently identical 
with the corresponding provisions of the Uniform 
Securities Act, Securities Act of 19 33, and Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, that it regards adjudica-
tions on those statutes as persuasive. S & F Supply 
Company v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (1974). 
- 7 -
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Since the statutory prohibition against 
securities fraud is designed to protect investors 
from deceptive practices, it is not surprising that 
the common law tort of deceit has provided the 
foundation for developing the compensatory aspects 
of the private right of action under Rule 10b-5. 
As one of the elements of the common law action for 
deceit, Professor Prosser lists justifiable reliance 
by the plaintiff• Wo Prosser, Handbook of The Law 
of Torts, § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). How-
ever, it has consistently been held in criminal 
prosecutions that: 
"It is not necessary to 
prove each of the elements of common 
law fraud or deceit to obtain a 
criminal conviction under Section 
17(a)." 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 
1430-44; 6 Loss 3526-55 (2d ed. 1961). 
Moreover, as the author of the leading law review 
article on criminal prosecutions under the federal 
securities laws has stated: 
"Consequently, a defrauded purchaser 
need not be located, since the 
Government does not have to establish 
that a victim actually was deceived, 
suffered actual loss, or otherwise 
relied upon the defendant's conduct. 
A mere offer made in a fraudulent 
manner violates the statute." 
39 George Washington Law Review 901, 
926 (1971). 
- 8 -
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Respondent contends that the appellant's mere offer, 
sale and purchase of securites was made in a fraudu-
lent manner and therefore violated the Utah statute, 
regardless of whether or not the victims actually 
relied on the scheme to defraud. 
Several well-reasoned federal cases have 
discussed the issue of reliance in a criminal 
prosecution. In United States v. Amick/ 439 F.2d 
351 (7th Cir. 19 71) , a stock salesman for a cor-
poration knowingly made misrepresentations to 
purchasers which were untrue, material, and intended 
to persuade prospective purchasers. Under the 
charge of violating Section 17(a), he contended 
that the government failed to prove that the 
purchasers relied on the untrue statements and 
the evidence showed that the purchasers had not 
testified that they either believed or relied on 
his assertions. The court affirmed the appellant1s 
conviction and held: 
"Courts have said that in 
prosecutions under 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), 
at least where a fraudulent scheme 
was employed, it is unnecessary to 
prove that a victim parted with 
money or property in reliance upon 
misrepresentations. 
- 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Considering the language 
of the three subdivisions of 77 
q(a), it is clear that the activity 
proscribed by subdivisions (1) and 
(3) need not be successful to be 
unlawful, and reliance by a victim need 
not be proved . . . we conclude that 
proof of any degree of reliance was 
not required here*" 439 F.2d at 366. 
In Estep v. United States, 223 F.2d 19 (5th Cir* 1965), 
cert, denied 350 U.S. 863, 76 S.Ct. 105, 100 L.Ed. 
765, the appellant was convicted of violating § 17(a) 
on the grounds that he intentionally induced per-
sons to purchase stock subscriptions of a corpora-
tion about to market a fuelless, self-energizing 
motor. The governments instruction to the jury 
charged in substance that it was not essential that 
the government prove that all of the investors 
in the company were defrauded, "but it is suffi-
cient if you so find that one or more of such 
investors were defrauded*" In response to the 
appellant's objection to the instruction, the 
court on appeal held that: 
"The charge placed a greater 
burden on the government than was 
actually required, since it is not 
necessary that the government prove 
that anyone was actually defrauded 
in order to show a violation of 
the statutes under which defendant 
was indicted." 223 F.2d at 22* 
- in -
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In Bobbroff v. United States, 202 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 
1953), appellant was convicted of violating § 17(a) 
by intentionally making false statements which were 
designed to encourage existing shareholders of a 
lawnmower manufacturer to purchase additional stock. 
The appellant contended that to constitute a crime 
each of the shareholders must have been deceived 
by the fraudulent offer or attempted fraud. 
The argument was grounded on the common law cases 
where fraud was charged against a defendant causing 
damage to a plaintiff where the plaintiff had not 
shown that the defendant actually deceived him to 
to his disadvantage. As in the present case, the 
appellant in Bobbroff, supra, cited no criminal 
cases which held that reliance was an essential 
element of a criminal action. The court held 
that the mere mailing of letters containing 
such misrepresentations constituted violations 
of the act even though the recipients were not 
deceived by the misrepresentations. See also 
United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 799 
(5th Cir. 1975); Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 
409, 419 (9th Cir. 1963), cert, denied 375 U.S. 992, 
84 S.Ct. 631, 11 L.Ed.2d 478; Frank v. United States, 
- 11 -
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220 F.2d 559, 563 (10th Cir. 1955); United States 
v. Bogy, 16 F.Supp. 407 (W.D. Tenn. 1936), aff'do 
96 F.2d 734 (6th Cir* 1938), cert, denied 305 U.S. 
608, 59 S.Ct. 68, 83 L.Ed. 387; Butler v. United 
States, 53 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1931); United States 
v. Schaefer, 299 F,2d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 1962), Hasting's 
dissent; Llanos v. United States, 205 F.2d 852, 854 
(9th Cir. 1953); and United States v. Jones, 380 F. 
Supp. 343, 345 (D.N.J* 1974). 
The above authorities are important because 
they differentiate between the fraud of common law 
on the one hand and the course of business which 
operates as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser of 
securities, or the sale by means of making an untrue 
statement of any material fact, or the omission 
of any material fact on the other hand. The 
appellants conduct in the present case was circum-
scribed by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(1) (1953), which 
specifically prohibits the employment of a device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud. The rule in Amick, 
supra, and in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage 
Exchange v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1959), 
although an injunction action, held that the fraud 
known to common law, which required reliance was not the fraud 
- 12 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
required to constitute a violation of § 17(a)(1) 
of the Securities Act of 19 33. Clearly, under the 
federal standard the trial court was correct in 
refusing the appellant's reliance instruction* 
As is the situation in Utah, few state 
courts have had the opportunity to deal with this 
issue. However, the issue was considered in 
Birchfield v. State of Texas, 401 S.W.2d 825, 828 
(Crim. App. 1966), where the appellant was con-
victed under a penal statute which provided that 
any person "engaged in any fraud or fraudulent 
practice in the sale, offering for sale or delivery 
of, invitation of offers, or dealing in any other 
manner in any security or securities shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony . . ." The court noted the dis-
tinction between reliance in criminal and civil 
securities fraud cases with the following; 
"In our original opinion we 
held the indictment and charge defective 
because they failed to allege and 
instruct the jury that the injured party 
relied upon the fraudulent representations 
made by appellant. In support of such 
holding we cited several civil cases 
which hold that one of the essential 
elements of fraud is that the injured 
party relied upon the fraudulent 
representation. We have now concluded 
that we were in error. 
- 13 -
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"Since reliance upon the fraudulent 
representation would not be an essential 
element of an offer for sale, or invita-
tion of offers, or dealing in any other 
manner in any security, we cannot bring 
ourselves to conclude that it was the 
intention of the legislature to require 
one quantum of proof where an offer 
to sell was made*, This is especially 
true where the several different ways 
a violation of the statute may be 
committed are embodied in the same 
paragraph of the statute. Since 
reliance need not be proven, it need 
not be alleged." 401 S.W.2d. at 828. 
Appellant cites S & F Supply Company v. Hunter, 
supra, for the proposition that a reliance instruc-
tion should have been given in the present case. 
However, that case is distinguishable on the 
grounds that it was not a criminal action, but 
rather a civil action brought by the sellers of 
stock against the buyer for breach of contract 
where the buyer counterclaimed for rescission of 
the contract. In addition, the buyer1s argument 
for rescission was not premised on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1 (1953), but rather on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-22(1) (b) (1953) , which specifically pro-
vided that a buyer who did not know of the untruth 
or omission had a private right of action against 
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the seller to recover the consideration paid for 
the security. Under the statute this Court held 
that a buyer could not blindly purchase stock 
but must show his reliance as a basis for avoiding 
his contract. Clearly, by holding that a reliance 
instruction is unnecessary in a criminal action 
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1) (1953)f this Court 
would not be required to deviate from the standard 
outlined in S & F Supply Company. 
Respondent also contends that even in 
civil cases the nature of the reliance requirement 
has been altered. The greatest step in this 
direction occurred in 1972 with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 
406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 1456# 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972). 
In Affiliated Ute, a bank and its employees made 
purchases from a group of unsophisticated securities 
holders without disclosing the higher price at 
which the securities were being traded in a secondary 
market fostered by the bank. There was no positive 
proof that the plaintiffs had relied upon the 
defendant's fraudulent conduct in deciding to sell 
their securities. The Supreme Court held that: 
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"[U]nder the circumstances of 
this case, involving primarily a 
failure to disclose, positive proof 
of reliance is not a prerequsite to 
recovery• All that is necessary is 
that the facts withheld be material 
in the sense that a reasonable investor 
might have considered them important 
in the making of this decision," 
406 U.S. at 153-154. 
The Tenth Circuit, citing Affiliated Ute, has also 
held that "there is no need to prove the elements 
of common law fraud, including positive proof 
of reliance." Resort Car Rental V. Ruwart Chevrolet, 
519 P.2d 317, 321 (10th Cir. 1975). See also 
88 Harvard Law Review 584 (19 75) and 1973 Utah Law 
Review 119. 
Finally, respondent contends that even 
if this Court finds that a reliance instruction 
may be applicable in certain criminal securities 
fraud cases, such an instruction was not necessary 
in the present case and its absence was not of 
sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal. As pointed 
out in other sections of respondent's brief, many of 
the victims in the present case were unaware that 
the appellant was on both sides of the transactions 
and that they were part of appellant's unlawful 
scheme (T. 26, 36, 55, 68, 81. 82, 110, 233, 241). 
For these reasons appellant1s argument concerning 
reliance should be rejected. 
- 16 -
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFENSE OF UNCLEAN 
HANDS BECAUSE THE DEFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE IN A 
CRIMINAL SECURITIES FRAUD PROSECUTION. 
The frequently stated maxim that "he who 
comes into equity must come with clean hands" 
is an ancient and favorite precept of the equity 
court. However, the general principle is well 
settled that equity has no jurisdiction in criminal 
matters which do not affect property. The prose-
cution of crimes is confided to the criminal courts, 
and the remedy by indictment and prosecution is 
deemed to be adequate. This Court has aLso stated 
that the clean hands doctrine is a fundamental 
principle of equity jurisprudence, but is not, 
in its application so much an absolute rule to 
be followed by the courts as it is a guide for 
determining whether, in a suit between two or more 
wrongdoers, relief should be granted. Park v. 
Jameson, 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1 (1961) (Emphasis 
added.) 
_ 1 -7 _ 
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In the present case it cannot be contended 
that the State of Utah, as plaintiff, had unclean 
hands in the prosecution of the case. In Deseret 
Apartments v. United States, 250 F.2d 457 (10th 
Cir. 1957), where the United States brought an 
action against a Utah apartment corporation to 
foreclose a real estate and chattel mortgage, the 
court held that unless the government did something 
which in good conscience it should not have done, 
or failed to do something fair dealing required it 
to do, it came into court with clean hands. 
In addition to the arguments that the 
defense of unclean hands is not available in a 
criminal prosecution, or against the State of Utah, 
many courts have held that the defense is not 
available in a private stock fraud action. Thus, 
in Texas Continental Life Insurance Company v. 
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962), where an 
ultimate buyer of municipal bonds brought a civil 
action for conspiracy to violate Sections 17(a), 
10(b), and Rule 10b-5 of the federal securities laws 
against the original buyer of such bonds, the court 
held that unclean hands was no defense to the claim 
of the ultimate buyer. 
- 18 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moreover, in private stock fraud suits 
where the defense has been recognized it is generally 
held that the trial court has wide discretion in 
its application. For example, in Wolf v. Frank, 
477 F.2d 467, rehearing denied 478 F.2d 1403 (5th 
Cir. 1973), cert, denied 414 U.S. 975. 94 S.Ct. 
287, 38 L.Ed.2d 218, rehearing denied 414 IKS. 
1104, 94 S.Ct. 739, 38 L.Ed.2d 860, where the 
plaintiffs were awarded individual and derivative 
relief from defendants for violations of Sections 
17(a), 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court held that 
while the defense of unclean hands was available in 
the Fifth Circuit, its application rested within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. The court 
further held that the test of whether the defense 
was allowed should be determined by ascertaining 
whether the application or non-application of the 
defense would better promote the objectives of 
the securities laws by increasing the protection 
afforded the investing public. 477 F.2d at 474. 
Also, in Cartier v. Dutton, 45 FRD 278, '64 - '66, CCH Fed* 
Sec. L. Rep. (Transfer Binder)~1[ 91, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
where the defendant alleged a champertous agreement 
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to bring the lawsuit and to harass the defendant 
in order to force him to sell his stock to persons 
who inspired and were controlling the suit, the 
court sustained the defense of unclean hands against 
a motion to dismiss or strike the defense and held 
that the defense was permitted not to aid the one 
asserting it but, rather, on the grounds of public 
policy and to protect the dignity of the Court, 
However, even if this Court finds that the 
doctrine of unclean hands may be applicable in 
a criminal securities fraud prosecution, it is 
nevertheless inapplicable in the present case for 
two reasons. First, it seems patently absurd that 
this Court could conceivably consider appellant's 
argument as serious that unclean hands is a 
defense where the appellant has the mistaken 
belief that he can blame others for his unlawful 
conduct. The objective of allowing unclean hands 
as a defense in a civil case appears reasonable 
since the plaintiff, against whom the defendant 
must assert the defense, is generally seeking 
damages. In the present criminal action, however, 
the respondent shouldered the burden of proving 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
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a higher burden eliminating the need for any 
equitable defenses. Moreover, the focus in any 
criminal action is solely upon the conduct of the 
defendant. The obvious defense in such an action, 
whether through direct evidence or cross-examination, 
must create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the 
jurors that the defendant did not commit the crime. 
Where the prosecution presents evidence tending 
to establish the defendant's guilt, it is for the 
jury to weigh the evidence in the defendant's case. 
Furthermore, instructing the jury as to unclean 
hands may improperly work to the appellant's own 
disadvantage by incriminating him through the 
conduct of others. Not only is such incrimination 
forbidden in a criminal case, but also by presenting 
the instruction the jurors could conceivably become 
confused by being instructed on the one hand to 
consider solely the conduct of the appellant, and on 
the other hand to consider the conduct of the victims. 
Second, the evidence in the present case 
shows that an instruction on unclean hands is com-
pletely unwarranted. At the most, the appellant 
contends that the victims were aware of the appel-
lant 's scheme during the "wash trades" or "float trades;11 
71 -
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The respondent demonstrates sufficiently in the 
Statement of Facts and under Point IV that such a 
conclusion is unreasonable (T. 26, 36, 55, 68, 81, 
82, 110, 223). However, even if the victim's 
know of the appellant's scheme, mere knowledge 
certainly cannot rise to the level of actual par-
ticipation in the defendants unlawful conductr 
Furthermore, the level of such participation 
must of necessity be higher than that civilly 
required since the action is actually brought on 
behalf of the whole of society rather than a 
single plaintiff or group of plaintiffsv 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED VARIOUS 
TYPES OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING APPELLANT'S UNLAWFUL 
INTENT AND SCHEME TO DEFRAUD BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE 
WAS RELEVANT, MATERIAL AND NOT PREJUDICAL TO 
APPELLANT'S CASE. 
The appellant claims that certain evidence 
was improperly admitted in the present case for 
two reasons. First, appellant claims that evidence 
concerning potential mergers of the Great Northern 
Corporation, personal loans he acquired for pay-
ment of stock, and losses suffered by victims and 
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non-victims prior to initiation of the scheme to 
defraud, was irrelevant, remote, immaterial and 
prejudicial. Second appellant claims that 
evidence with respect to conversations of Robert 
Shields, provisionally admitted on the grounds that 
Shields would subsequently be shown to be an agent 
of appellant, was hearsay and inadmissible. Respon-
dent contends, however, that such evidence was 
admissible to prove appellant's intent and unlawful 
conduct in this complex scheme to defraud. 
Generally, evidence which shows acts similar 
to those of the appellant in the present case has 
been freely admitted by fedeoaL courts. In United 
States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 946 (2nd Cir. 1961), 
where seven defendants were charged with using a 
plan which resulted in the defendants "purchasing" 
control of a corporation by using its own funds, 
and thereby defrauding the other stockholders, 
the court held that transactions prior to the fraudu-
lent transaction, although not pleaded in the indict-
ment, were relevant and not prejudicial. The court 
held that such transactions showed an early 
connection between defendants; they indicated a known 
falsity; they were relevant to one of the defendant's 
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knowledge of the falsity of the reputation; and 
they were highly relevant to the issue of criminal 
intent and knowing complicity in the fraud. Moreover, 
in United States v. Livengood, 427 F.2d 420, 424 
(9th Cir0 1970), a director indicted under § 17(a) 
for selling debentures, claimed remoteness in that 
the trial court erred in permitting evidence of 
defendants actions two years before the company 
defaulted on the debentures. The court, however, 
held that although evidence of his kind was damaging 
and prejudicial, it was relevant and hence not 
erroneously admittedc The court noted that during 
the time both defendants were cooperating together 
in a scheme to defraud investorst they "boosted" 
the corporation to one victim, and they participated 
in attempting to convince investors in a reorganiza-
tion plan after the corporation failed to meet its 
obligations. Furthermore, in United States v. Dardi, 
330 F.2d 316, 332 (2nd Cir. 1964)f where the presi-
dent and three broker-dealers of a large corporation 
were convicted of conspiring to sell unregistered 
stock to the public, the court held that there was 
no merit in the contention that the appellants were 
prejudiced by the testimony of the unfortunate 
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purchasers of the corporation's stock, and such 
testimony was relevant to numerous counts of the 
indictment. 
In connection with the above federal standards, 
it is clear that evidence in the present case con-
cerning prior transactions, personal loans, and 
losses suffered by the victims of this securities 
fraud, is admissible. "Relevant evidence" is 
defined in Rule 1(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
to mean "evidence having any tendency in reason to 
prove or disprove the existence of any material 
fact." Nearly all of the evidence which appellant 
claims was improperly admitted is relevant to 
the issue of appellant1s intent to defraud. 
Possible mergers of Great Northern and the existence 
of loans are directly related to the nature of the 
shell corporation and the appellant's intent to 
make the corporation appear to be of substantial 
substance. In addition, such evidence was relevant 
to increased market activity in Great Northern's 
stock which was a specific link in appellant's 
scheme to defraud. Also, although this conduct 
occurs prior to the acts alleged in the indictment, 
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it is all part of the preliminary preparation of 
appellant's scheme, and therefore not remote. 
Prejudice, which appellant claims occurred as 
a result of the admission of this evidence, 
must be distinguished from relevant, material 
evidence outlining the purposes behind appellant's 
specific unlawful conduct. 
Appellant's claim of inadmissible hearsay 
can also be rejected upon several grounds. First, 
Rule 63(9) (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows: 
"As against a party, a statement 
which would be admissible if made by the 
declarant at the hearing if ...(b) 
the party and the declarant were 
participating in a plan to commit 
a crime or a civil wrong and the 
statement was relevant to the plan or 
its subject matter and was made while 
the plan was in existence and before 
its complete execution or other 
terminationc * ." . . 
Appellant's rejection of the vicarious admission 
exception to the hearsay rule assumes that the 
statements were declared after'the execution of 
the scheme. However, respondent has shown and 
adequately demonstrates under Point IV of this 
brief that the scheme was in existence at the 
time of the statements0 
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Second, Shields1 statements were authorized 
under Rule 63(8) , since Shields was persuaded to 
become a participant in appellant's scheme. Shields 
allowed the appellant to use his account and this 
fact was attested to not only by Shields, but also 
by the purchasing brokerage houses (T. 28, 86# 
339-341)o In addition, Shields used appellant's 
checks written by appellant's wife and this fact 
was also confirmed not only by Shields, but by 
the purchasing brokerage houses (T. 27-28, 86, 
341-43). Moreover, Shields worked with the 
appellant in a business manned by acquiring and 
making various substantial loans to the appellant. 
Third, statements of design or plan are in 
general admissible so far as the design or plan 
is relevant to show the doing of the act designed. 
IV Wigmore on Evidence § 1732 (3d. ed. 1940). 
However, even if this Court should decide 
that the trial court improperly admitted certain 
evidence, this court is required to render judg-
ment without regard to errors or defects which do 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
As part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), states: 
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"After hearing an appeal the court 
must give judgment without regard to 
errors or defects which do not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties. 
If error has been committed, it shall 
not be presumed to have resulted in 
prejudice. The court must be satis-
fied that it has that effect before 
it is warranted in reversing the 
judgment«" 
In State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 
(1973), this Court held that in order to interfere 
with a jury verdict, the error must be such that 
it was reasonably probable that there would have 
been a result more favorable to the defendant in 
the absence of error. In the present case the 
record compels the conclusion that the asserted 
errors were insignificant and in no way resulted 
in prejudice to the defendant's case. See also 
State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d 491 
(1970). 
This result was applied in a criminal 
securities prosecution in Farrell v. United States, 
supra, at 419, where the appellant's were charged 
with a violation of § 17(a)(1) in that they created 
a plan designed as a secured 10% earnings program. 
The Court held that the fact that some evidence may 
have gotten into the record by investor witnesses 
who had not received their investments back, did 
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not constitute a prejudicial error sufficient to 
warrant a reversal. The court went on to hold that it 
is to be presumed that the jury heeded the instruc-
tion of the court and that any error in the admission 
of such evidence was cured by the cautionary instruc-
tion. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT OF GUILTY BECAUSE REASONABLE MINDS 
COULD BELIEVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE 
APPELLANT, IN CONNECTION WITH THE OFFER, SALE OR 
PURCHASE OF SECURITIES, EMPLOYED A DEVICE, SCHEME, 
OR ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD. 
The rules governing the scope of appellate 
review as to sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal 
case to sustain the verdict are well settled: It 
is for the jury to judge the credibility of witnesses 
and determine the facts; evidence will be reviewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict; and if 
when so viewed it appears the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed* 
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959). 
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Reasonable doubt is described as follows: 
11
 'Reasonable doubt' is not a mere 
imaginary, captious, or a possible doubt, 
but a fair doubt, based upon reason and 
common sense, and growing out of testimony 
in the case, and it is such doubt as 
will leave juror*s mind, after a care-
ful examination of all evidence, in such 
condition that he cannot say he has an 
abiding conviction, to a moral certaintyf 
of defendant's guilt." State v, Taylor, 
21 Utah 2d 425, 446 P.2d 954 (1968). 
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), 
cert. den. 355 U.S. 848, 78 S.Ct. 74, 2 L.Ed.2d 57 
further adds: ". . *proof beyond all peradventure of 
doubt could seldom be had, nor does the law require 
it." 
Respondent contends that the evidence 
presented by the State in the trial recordf viewed 
under the above standards, is more than adequate to 
support the jury's verdict of guilty. 
•:•••••• Because of the nature of the crime, stock 
fraud is rarely proved by a single specific act 
of the appellant. The inference of guilt in most 
instances must be drawn from several indicia of 
fraud which collectively tend to incriminate the 
appellant. 
The appellant's unlawful conduct consisted 
of a series of several simple but deceptive trans-
actions which collectively constituted a complex 
scheme designed to defraud investors. First, the 
3 ^ A T I ^ 4 . flefaKiicViD^ various nominee accounts at 
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eight brokerage houses in the names of individuals 
who had no knowledge of transactions conducted 
therein and no knowledge of the scheme to defraud 
(T. 37-38, 308-309, 315, 317, 321, 323). Other 
accounts were also established by the appellant 
(T. 38). 
Second, the defendant caused the stock of 
Great Northern Corporation, Silver Gull Corporation, 
and West Am Corporation to be bought and sold, 
thus creating an artificial market activity and price 
in these stocks. The purpose of creating this artificial 
market activity and price was to obtain money from other 
persons, including several brokerage houses (T. 39, 74, 
155, 223, 228, 294-296). This conclusion is evidenced 
by the fact that the market in the stock collapsed when 
the appellant executed all the buy and sell orders at 
the same time, and by the fact that the appellant's 
purchases of stock immediately after expressing an 
interest in the company caused a significant impact 
on the market rise (T.71, 91, 158, 179, 388, 402, 
413, 484). 
Third, the defendant through his agents purchased 
certain amounts of stock of Great Northern Corpora-
tion, Silver Gull Corporation, and West Am 
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Corporation in the various nominee accounts and, 
at the same time, sold the same amount of stock 
at Continental also in various nominee accountsc 
Under this "wash trade" or "float trade" the 
purchased stocks were paid for by the brokerage 
firms where the stock was purchased, and, unknown 
to the purchasing firms, the proceeds which were 
delivered to Continental were actually delivered 
to the appellant (T. 26, 36, 55, 68, 81, 82, 110, 
233, 241). 
Fourth, the appellant, on the accounts of 
Barbara Facer and William Birkinshaw, caused checks 
to be issued to the brokerage firms where the stocks 
had been purchased, and the checks were all drawn 
against insufficient funds, causing an aggregate 
loss of over $150^000, all of which remained unpaid 
(T, 40) • 
Fifth, the appellant intentionally employed 
a scheme to defraud by intentionally establishing 
nominee accounts, creating artificial market activity, 
and price in the stocks, conducting "wash trades" or 
"float trades/1 receiving the proceeds from such 
trades, and writing checks against insufficient funds 
for the purpose of deceiving unknowing investors * 
The possibility of any other reasonable hypothesis 
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as they did, that the appellant intentionally employed 
a scheme to defraud. 
The above rules governing the scope of appellate 
review as to sufficiency of the evidence are especially 
applicable following a verdict of stock fraud. In 
United States v. Dardi, supra, the court noted the 
following concerning sufficiency of the evidence: 
"Because a large portion of the 
errors asserted by appellants are 
bottomed on . . . sufficiency of proof, 
it is appropriate to advert to certain 
long established principles of appellate 
review. A jury of twelve has heard all 
the testimony, explanations of the 
meaning of a vast number of exhibits, and 
the exhaustive summations of counsel, and 
has been instructed on the applicable legal 
rules. Their verdict, after due considera-
tion, was that appellants were, on the facts 
and the law, guilty of substantive crimes 
and of conspiracy. It was within the 
exclusive domain of the jury to choose 
between competing inferences of fact, 
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 
563 (2d Cir. 1956), revfd on other grounds, 
353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 
(1957). On appeal the evidence must be 
considered in a light most favorable to the 
Government. United States v. Tutino, 
269 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1959). Moreover, 
miscroscopic dissection of bits and pieces 
of evidence when laid out in a cold record 
overlooks the truism that 'logically the sum 
is often greater than the aggregate of the 
parts, and the cumulation of instances * * * 
may have a probative force immensely greater 
than any one of them alone.1 United States 
v. White, 124 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1941)." 
330 F.2d at 325. 
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Also, in United States v, Dukow, 330 F.Supp. 360, 
362-63 (W.D. Pa, 1971), the major stockholder and president 
of Champion Industries, Incc, a paper corporation with no 
substantial assets, was convicted of participating in a scheme 
or artifice to defraud the investors of Champion under Section 
17(a)« The defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, and, 
in the alternative, for a new trial, on the grounds of 
insufficiency of evidence. The court denied both motions 
and held that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a 
finding by the jury of a scheme or artifice to defraud 
investors, even though Dukow made no sales personally, since 
schemes to defraud may be sustained on circumstantial evidence 
alone. The evidence showed that Dukow was the principal 
link between Champion and CBC, an over-the-counter brokerage 
firm, and both knew of the lurking dangers of certain out-
standing notes which could have caused repossession of the 
paper plant, Champion's poor financial status, and nebulous 
prospects for acquisitions * but never revealed this informa-
tion to investors. 
The thrust of the appellant's argument focuses 
on the legality of specific acts within the scheme. However, 
as the court in Dardi noted above, the appellant should not 
- 34 -
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be allowed to dissect his conduct into small lawful trans-
actions. The statute speaks in terms of a "scheme" to 
defraud and the putting together of otherwise legal acts 
to formulate an illegal act is no less unlawful than 
committing a single unlawful act. Clearly this court 
should not require that respondent prove that every 
single act was in itself a violation of the statute. 
Furthermore, even if more than one reasonable 
inference could be drawn from the evidence, this 
Court has stated that "where different reasonable inferences 
can be drawn from the evidence, the question is one exclusively 
within the providence of the jury." State v. Thatcher, 108 
Utah 63, 157 P«2d 258 (1945). The evidence being more 
than adequate to sustain the findings of fact arrived at by 
the jury, this Court should be very reluctant to overturn 
that jury verdict. 
The jury had sufficient basis from the evidence 
presented at trial to find the defendant guilty of stock 
fraud beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court should 
therefore sustain the verdict and judgment of the trial 
court. 
-35-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Because instructions to the jury with respect 
to the element of reliance and the unclean hands defense 
are not required in a criminal securities fraud prosecution 
and because sufficient and proper evidence was admitted by 
the trial court, and any errors that may have been committed 
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt/ respondent respect-
fully submits that appellants request for a reversal of the 
conviction and sentence and dismissal of the charges or, in 
the alternative, remand for a new trial, be denied and that 
the verdict and judgment of the jury at the trial be affirmed* 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
STEPHEN R. RANDLE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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